Liz Jackson
Assistant Professor Faculty of Arts Department of Philosophy Toronto, Ontario lizjackson111@torontomu.ca
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Bio/Research
I’m an Assistant Professor in the Department of Philosophy at Toronto Metropolitan University (formerly Ryerson). Previously, I was a Research Fellow in the School of Philosophy at Australian National University. I received my PhD from the Department of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame,...
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Bio/Research
I’m an Assistant Professor in the Department of Philosophy at Toronto Metropolitan University (formerly Ryerson). Previously, I was a Research Fellow in the School of Philosophy at Australian National University. I received my PhD from the Department of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame, and my BA in philosophy at Kansas State University.
My primary research is in epistemology, much of it falling at the intersection between formal and traditional epistemology. Recently, my research has focused on the relationship between belief and credence. I defend and explore implications of dualism about belief and credence. Dualism is the view that we have both beliefs and credences, and neither attitude is reducible to the other. My interests in epistemology also include (defending) epistemic permissivism, (arguing against) pragmatic and moral encroachment, and other issues in social epistemology (e.g., disagreement, epistemic paternalism).
My secondary research interests are in philosophy of mind, specifically the nature of belief, and philosophy of religion, specifically Pascal’s Wager and the nature of faith. I have further interest in decision theory, ethics and normativity, and metaphysics.
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My primary research is in epistemology, much of it falling at the intersection between formal and traditional epistemology. Recently, my research has focused on the relationship between belief and credence. I defend and explore implications of dualism about belief and credence. Dualism is the view that we have both beliefs and credences, and neither attitude is reducible to the other. My interests in epistemology also include (defending) epistemic permissivism, (arguing against) pragmatic and moral encroachment, and other issues in social epistemology (e.g., disagreement, epistemic paternalism).
My secondary research interests are in philosophy of mind, specifically the nature of belief, and philosophy of religion, specifically Pascal’s Wager and the nature of faith. I have further interest in decision theory, ethics and normativity, and metaphysics.
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