Dr. Mohammad Nikoofal joined the faculty of the Ted Rogers School of Management in 2016 as an assistant professor in global management studies. Previously, he was an assistant professor of operations and supply chain management at Catolica-Lisbon school of business and economics in Lisbon, Portug...
Dr. Mohammad Nikoofal joined the faculty of the Ted Rogers School of Management in 2016 as an assistant professor in global management studies. Previously, he was an assistant professor of operations and supply chain management at Catolica-Lisbon school of business and economics in Lisbon, Portugal. He earned his Ph.D. in Operations Management from Desautels Faculty of Management at McGill University, Montreal, Quebec. He also holds a M.Sc. in Industrial Engineering and Operations Research from Tehran Polytechnic, and a B.Sc. in Industrial Engineering from Isfahan University of Technology.
His research focuses on the application of operations research techniques, specifically game theory and robust optimization, and economics methodologies, specifically theory of incentives and mechanism design with special focus on information asymmetry, to develop normative recommendations in both public policy, in the context of homeland security and public-private partnership in security, and private sector, in the context of supply chain risk management.
His research in homeland security aims to help government to explore the impact of terrorist’s private information in defensive resource allocation decisions. Thanks to his research in homeland security and his background in economics, his current research focuses on developing public incentives to attract private sector investment in security. This is one of the demanding research areas indicated by Canadian Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC). He currently holds insight development grant from SSHRC to develop models of Public-Private Partnership to enhance Canadian homeland security. On the other hand, his research in supply chain risk management mainly focuses on designing effective contractual strategies, and exploring their incentive-related problems, in a decentralized supply chain under information asymmetry.